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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
I. Does the First Amendment’s free speech protection extend to grades administered to 
a student? 
II. If not, does the doctrine of academic freedom afford protection to individual 
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Pemberley’s Opinion and 
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (R. at 13) is unreported. The Opinion and Order 
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixteenth Circuit (R. at 19) is unreported. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Sixteenth Circuit entered judgment on June 5, 2014. (R. at 
21). Petitioner filed her petition for writ of certiorari on June 25, 2014 (R. at 23). This Court 
granted the petition on October 15, 2014. (R. at 24). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1) (2006). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact-findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
CONSTITIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On June 8, 2013, Elizabeth Bennet (“Respondent”) filed a complaint against the College 
of Southern Pemberley (the “College”) in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Pemberley, alleging the College violated her free speech rights when they dismissed 
her for refusing to follow a directive to reevaluate a student’s paper and grade. (R. at 1–4). The 
College filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Respondent failed to state a free speech 
claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. at 6–8). The District Court granted the College’s 
motion to dismiss. (R. at 13–16). Respondent appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixteenth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. (R. at 17–21). On October 
15, 2014, this Court granted the College’s petition for Writ of Certiorari. (R. at 24).  
 
 
	   1	  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 In August of 2008, the College employed Respondent, who had just completed her Ph.D., 
as an assistant professor of English literature. (R. at 13). A month later, Respondent began 
teaching a class at the College based on author Jane Austen. Id. In the fall of 2012, the College 
admitted George Wickham, a junior, as a transfer student-athlete from New York University. (R. 
at 14). Mr. Wickham immediately joined the College’s basketball team and, in January of 2013, 
enrolled in the Jane Austen class Respondent taught. Id. During the 2013 season, the College’s 
basketball program improved greatly and defeated Respondent’s alma mater, the University of 
Pemberley, for the first time in school history. Id. Later that season, the College won its first 
state championship and was invited to a national invitational tournament to be held in October. 
Id. The team’s historic success brought the College unprecedented publicity, even from out-of-
state newspapers. Id. Alumni donations increased, and more prospective students visited the 
College that spring than ever before. Id.  
 That same semester, a local newspaper alleged Mr. Wickham received special treatment 
due to his athletic ability. Id. In mid-April, they reported the College dean ordered professors to 
excuse all of Mr. Wickham’s absences. Id. An opinion piece in the newspaper also criticized the 
school for providing special accommodations to student-athletes. Id. 
 Given Mr. Wickham’s participation in interscholastic basketball, his attendance in 
Respondent’s classes was around 50 percent. Id. Based on his final paper on Pride and 
Prejudice, which was worth merely 60 percent of his grade, Respondent issued Mr. Wickham an 
“F” in the class due to poor performance. Id. Under Pemberley Athletic Division rules, an “F” on 
his transcript prohibited Mr. Wickham from participating in any sports-related activities. Id.  
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 When the College found out about Respondent’s actions, they ordered her to re-evaluate 
Mr. Wickham’s paper and grade. (R. at 14–15). Though the College could have administratively 
re-evaluated Mr. Wickham’s performance in class, they directed Respondent to do so because 
they wanted to avoid playing into the newspaper’s narrative. (R. at 14). As to why she refused to 
comply with the College’s directive, Respondent cited her disapproval of the College’s 
preferential treatment of Mr. Wickham as a student-athlete and his sub-par performance. (R. at 
15). The College subsequently changed the grade and received public criticism for their decision. 
Id. On May 22, 2013, the College sent Respondent a letter terminating her employment. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
 This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of limiting the extent to which conduct 
should be granted free speech protection. Not only did this Court emphasize the inherently 
expressive nature required for conduct to fall within the ambit of protected speech, it has stressed 
the politically expressive nature of the conduct time and again. Here, Respondent’s act of issuing 
a grade, though it may be considered inherently expressive, is not political in nature and is thus 
not protected speech. 
II. 
 The majority of circuit courts hold, for the First Amendment to apply, a professor’s 
refusal to follow a university grading directive must be accompanied by both meaningful protest 
or advocacy and the university’s retaliation to the professor for his protest or advocacy. The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court that has held a university 
unconstitutionally dismissed a professor for refusing to follow a university grading directive. In 
doing so, the Sixth Circuit not only undermined this Court’s free speech jurisprudence, it has 
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since been repudiated by other circuit courts. Additionally, the factual scenario is markedly 
different from the case at hand and involved much more than a simple refusal to grade as 
directed. Hence, this Court must reject the Sixth’s Circuit’s ruling as an exception to the rule.  
III. 
 The academic freedom doctrine, itself borne of the First Amendment, was initially 
established by this Court to preserve the “essential freedoms” colleges and universities. The 
ability of colleges and universities to set their own grading standards and criteria, as well as the 
fact that grades are integral to a university’s ability to fulfill its function in society, suggests 
grades belong to the university not individual professors. 
 How much academic freedom teachers and professors are afforded, and what exactly that 
freedom entails, is an issue with which courts have struggled. For the most part, courts hold a 
professor’s academic freedom relates to his or her ability to control classroom content and to 
choose which teaching method is best. Because grades are not part of classroom content or a 
teaching method, they are not protected by academic freedom. Hence, the doctrine does not 
apply to Respondent in these circumstances. As between the College’s academic freedom and the 
professor’s academic freedom, and grading policy belongs to the College. 
IV. 
 The public employee doctrine asserts, if a public employee claims her employer fired her 
in retaliation to her exercise of free speech, the employee must have spoken in her role as a 
private citizen speaking on a matter of public concern in order for such a claim to stand on First 
Amendment grounds. Another aspect of the doctrine is, if a public employee is speaking in her 
capacity as an employee pursuant to her official duties, such speech is not protected even if she is 
fired for such speech. Respondent’s speech, if her grade is speech at all, was not only made as 
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part of her official duties as a professor, but it was not made in Respondent’s role as a private 
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern. Therefore, she cannot claim the College violated 
her free speech rights in terminating her for insubordination. 
V. 
 Based on the importance of colleges and universities to furthering democratic ideals, and 
the academic freedom this Court has granted to such institutions, colleges and universities should 
enjoy minimal judicial oversight when their actions are done in the furtherance of an educational 
mission. Indeed, many lower courts have recognized the need to allow colleges and universities 
to function without excessive judicial oversight. Additionally, even though a college or 
university’s decisions may be completely lawful, their decisions are still subjected to free market 
forces and measures taken by regulatory and licensing agencies—both of which serve as 
efficient, non-judicial checks on college and university behavior.  
ARGUMENT 
This Court has long held a non-tenured professor may be terminated for just about any 
reason other than expressing a constitutionally protected right. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 597 (1972). Consequently, Respondent’s employment as a non-tenured professor at the 
College—a public school—is at-will and the College may dismiss her for any reason short of her 
expression of a constitutionally protected right. 
 
I. THE COLLEGE DID NOT VIOLATE RESPONDENT’S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS BECAUSE 
THE ACT OF ISSUING A GRADE IS NOT PROTECTED SPEECH. 
 
A. This Court has recognized the limitations on equating conduct with protected 
speech. 
  
When faced with the issue of when conduct rises to the level of protected speech, this 
Court has expressed great trepidation in labeling an unlimited variety of conduct as such. See 
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United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the view that free speech 
protection extends to all activity an actor intends to be communicative); see also Spence v. 
Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (acknowledging the O’Brien court’s limitation on labeling 
conduct as speech). Moreover, it is not enough that the actor intends the conduct to express an 
idea; the conduct must be expressive in and of itself. Rumsfeld v. Forum of Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65–66 (2006).  
In Rumsfeld, an association of law schools and law school faculties claimed a federal law 
violated law schools’ free speech rights because it conditioned federal funding on whether 
universities provided military recruiters the same access to students as other recruiters, and some 
law schools refused to do so because they objected to the military’s treatment of homosexuals. 
Id.at 52–53. Nevertheless, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the law. Id. at 70. This Court 
partly based its holding on the conclusion that the law schools’ conduct was not inherently 
expressive; that is, law schools’ exclusion of military recruiters—on its face—did not express 
anything at all. Id. at 66–67. The only way the law schools’ conduct could be expressive, the 
Court noted, is if it was accompanied by speech explaining it—even then not rising to the level 
of protected speech. Id. 
B. When equating inherently expressive conduct with protected speech, this Court 
has stressed the political nature of the expressive conduct. 
 
In Spence, this Court fully developed the “symbolic speech” test and held conduct may 
be considered speech if one intends such conduct to convey a particularized message highly 
likely to be understood by those viewing it. 418 U.S. at 410–11. Furthermore, this Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the political nature of the expressive conduct essential to a bringing it 
within the realm of free speech. See id. at 410 (noting the student expressed his distress about 
current affairs by displaying an upside-down, peace symbol-bearing flag in his apartment 
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window); see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77 (stating the speech involved, assuming it existed 
at all, consisted of an individual expressing his antiwar beliefs by burning his draft card); 
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 (pointing out the First Amendment protects the inherently expressive 
act of burning the American flag).  
Here, although the act of issuing a letter grade may be considered an inherently 
expressive conduct, such conduct obviously does not express anything political in nature; 
Respondent’s conduct merely expressed her dissatisfaction with Mr. Wickham’s performance. 
(R. at 14). Hence, under O’Brien and its progeny, this Court should not consider Respondent’s 
conduct as protected speech, regardless if her conduct may be labeled expressive. 
II. THE COLLEGE DID NOT VIOLATE RESPONDENT’S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS BECAUSE 
HER REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE COLLEGE’S DIRECTIVE IS NOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED. 
 
A. Circuit courts largely hold a professor’s refusal to follow a university directive 
alone does not qualify for First Amendment protection. 
 
In cases involving a professor’s refusal to grade as directed, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared the First Amendment does 
not protect such a refusal unless some form of meaningful protest or advocacy—and retaliation 
on behalf of the university for that protest or advocacy—accompanies it. See Hillis v. Stephen F. 
Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 550–53 (5th Cir. 1982) (stressing the First Amendment may 
protect a professor against retaliation for her protest against a university policy, but not for 
simply refusing a university grading directive); see also Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 
419, 425 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding the university did not terminate a professor due to his act of 
advocating a change in grading standards but for refusing to change his grading standards) 
(emphasis in original).  
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In Hillis, the court denied a professor’s First Amendment claim because the only 
substantial First Amendment activity involved the professor’s complaint to his superiors 
regarding university grading procedures, which the court stressed occurred after a meeting 
regarding his re-assignment and which, therefore, could not have played a part in the university’s 
decision to fire him. 665 F.2d at 550. The Lovelace court similarly denied a professor’s First 
Amendment claim. 793 F.2d at 425. The court pointed out, while the professor advocated a 
change in grading standards, the university was receptive to his ideas and did not fire him in 
retaliation for his exercise of any constitutionally protected right, but dismissed him for his 
refusal to change his standards to meet their criteria. Id. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held a university could sanction a professor for refusing to follow their 
grading policy even if he publically voiced opposition to the policy. Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 
888, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In Wozniak, the professor refused to follow the university’s grading 
policy, which required him to submit his grading materials at the end of the semester, and he 
defied subsequent orders to comply. Id. The university then sanctioned him for his 
insubordination. Id. The court struck down the professor’s claim that the university retaliated 
against him for taking a stand against their grading policy because they concluded the university 
was free both to decide their own grading policy and to sanction him for his insubordination. Id. 
at 891. 
Here, the record shows Respondent’s refusal to reevaluate Mr. Wickham’s grade was 
steeped in her dislike of the College’s treatment of student-athletes and Mr. Wickham’s subpar 
performance on his final paper. (R. at 15). Indeed, Respondent’s refusal to follow the College’s 
directive was unaccompanied by any meaningful protest or advocacy vis-à-vis the College’s 
grading policies or procedures. Id. A fortiori, the College could not have retaliated against her for 
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the exercise of any protest or advocacy associated with her refusal and thus did not infringe on 
her free speech rights.  
B. This Court must reject the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Parate because the court 
erred in holding grades are protected speech and because Parate is 
distinguishable from our case. 
 
Contrary to this Court’s free speech jurisprudence and the rulings in Lovelace, Hillis, and 
Wozniak, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded grades are not only “symbolic 
speech,” grades are protected speech. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989). The 
Parate court held university administrators violated the professor’s constitutional rights by 
unduly coercing him to change a grade he had previously assigned to a student rather than 
changing the grade themselves. Id. at 829. With regard to the ruling in Parate, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested the Sixth Circuit’s analysis presented an unrealistic view 
of the university-professor relationship and declined to apply the Parate rationale to a similar 
case. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3rd Cir. 2001).  
Beyond the fact that Parate contradicts preceding and succeeding authority regarding 
whether a grade should rise to the level of protected speech, the factual scenario is markedly 
different from the present case. In addition to university administrators directing the professor to 
change the grade, Parate involved repeated abusive and coercive tactics on behalf of 
administrators in an attempt to compel the professor to act and in retaliation for his refusal to 
change the student’s grade. Id. at 824. For example, university administrators castigated the 
professor on multiple occasions, threatened to wreck his evaluations, hindered his ability to 
pursue research opportunities, and otherwise undermined his ongoing research efforts. Id. In the 
present case, the College has not coerced Respondent in the least; they have simply directed her 
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to re-evaluate Mr. Wickham’s performance in her class, she refused, and they fired her for 
insubordination. (R. at 14–15).  
III. THE COLLEGE DID NOT VIOLATE RESPONDENT’S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS BECAUSE 
THE DOCTRINE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM DOES NOT APPLY TO HER UNDER THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
A. Under the doctrine of academic freedom, if grades are considered speech, such 
speech belongs to the College. 
 
The doctrine of academic freedom was first articulated in reference to the “four essential 
freedoms” of the university. See Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234. 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (stating the four essential freedoms include the university’s ability to decide who 
may teach, what is taught, how a course is taught, and who is admitted to study). This Court went 
on to fully adopt Justice Frankfurter’s concurring language regarding the “four essential 
freedoms” in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(underscoring the university’s freedom to choose who may be admitted to study). Moreover, in 
light of the fact that grading is pedagogic in nature, the issuance of a grade as it relates to 
academic freedom is incorporated into the university’s freedom to choose how a course is taught. 
Brown, 247 F.3d at 75.  
Because grades are a university’s “stock and trade,” and appear on university-issued 
transcripts, the Seventh Circuit determined grades—to the extent they can be considered 
speech—belong to the university, not to individual professors. Wozniak, 236 F. 3d at 891. 
Additionally, the Wozniak court concluded the amount of control universities grant their 
professors over grading is a decision wholly vested in the university. Id. The Third Circuit 
likewise recognized the limitations on free speech as it relates to a professor’s grades. Brown, 
247 F.3d at 74–75. In Brown, the professor assigned an “F” to a student because the student 
missed 80 percent of his class. Id. at 72. University officials ordered the professor to change the 
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student’s grade, the professor refused, and the university reprimanded him for his refusal. Id. The 
court ultimately held the university did not violate the professor’s free speech rights because 
professors speak as a “proxy” of the university when issuing grades so a professor cannot claim 
free speech protection via the university’s grade assignment protocols because grades belong to 
the university and not individual professors. Id. at 75. In the present case, the College has 
essentially done the same as the university in Brown; that is, they requested Respondent 
reevaluate a student’s grade and discharged her for insubordination after she refused to fulfill 
their request. (R. at 14–15). 
B. Protection under the doctrine of academic freedom relates to Respondent’s 
course content and teaching method only, and issuing a grade is neither. 
 
Courts have struggled to define the parameters of academic freedom—in terms of 
whether, and to what extent, it affords protection to individual professors. See Hillis, 665 F.2d at 
553 (noting courts’ inconsistent approaches to academic freedom); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 
216 F.3d 401, 410–11(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing the history and inconsistent court 
decisions regarding academic freedom). As a result, decisions range from broad declarations and 
qualified protection to outright denial. Compare Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967) (rejecting as unconstitutional any university action or state law casting a “pall of 
orthodoxy” over the classroom), and Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 
1985) (concluding academic freedom signifies the individual professor’s freedom to undertake 
his or her ends without university interference), with Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410 (holding academic 
freedom is an institutional right not an individual right). Nevertheless, while recognizing 
academic freedom may apply both to universities and individual professors, courts have been 
reluctant to extend protection beyond a professor’s classroom content and teaching method.  See 
Hillis, 665 F.2d at 553 (stating academic freedom protects against violations of a teacher’s class 
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content and teaching method). But see Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(holding academic freedom does not shield a non-tenured teacher’s teaching method from 
review). Even assuming academic freedom protects against infringements on a professor’s 
teaching method, assigning grades is not part of a professor’s teaching method. Hillis, 665 F.2d 
at 553. Respondent’s act of assigning a grade, which is not a part of her teaching method, is thus 
not protected by the doctrine of academic freedom.  
IV. EVEN IF GRADES ARE CONSIDERED RESPONDENT’S SPEECH, THE PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE PRECLUDES A FREE SPEECH CLAIM UNDER THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
The public employee doctrine, as this Court set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), limits a public employee’s 
ability to bring a free speech claim against a their employer. The majority in Pickering proposed 
a balancing test wherein the employee’s interests—as a private citizen speaking on issues of 
public concern—are weighed against the public employer’s interests in bolstering the efficiency 
of the services it provides via its employees. 391 U.S. at 568. In Connick, this Court adopted a 
contextual approach to determining whether a public employee’s speech involves a matter of 
public concern. 461 U.S. at 147–48. That is, any such determination must be based on the 
content and form of the speech, as well as the context in which it was made. Id. What is more, 
this Court has since placed further limitations on public employee free speech claims arising in 
the workplace. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding the Constitution does 
not protect a public employee’s speech if their statements are made “pursuant to their official 
duties”). It follows that where, as here, a public employee claims her dismissal was based on 
employer retaliation to her exercise of free speech, the Court must deny her claim: (1) if her 
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speech was not made in her capacity as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern; or (2) if 
the she was speaking pursuant to her official duties.  
In the present case, the public employee doctrine clearly precludes Respondent’s claim. If 
Respondent’s act of issuing a grade is to be construed as her speech, it clearly was not made in 
her capacity as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern. Applying the content-form-
context standard, she issued the grade to “communicate” to Mr. Wickham what she thought of 
his performance on his final paper. (R. at 15). Moreover, even if Respondent’s issuance of a 
grade can be fairly understood as speaking on a matter of public concern, issuing grades is part 
of her official duties as a professor at a public college. Therefore, the College is free to discipline 
her for that communication. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding when employees speak 
“pursuant to their official duties,” they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes and their speech is therefore not Constitutionally protected from employer discipline).  
Respondent may argue she is exempt from the public employee doctrine because, as an 
assistant professor, she is of a special class of public employee. This argument is untenable. 
Indeed, the very case from which this doctrine derived involved a public teacher, and several 
cases have since applied the doctrine to professors. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564 (involving a 
public school teacher reprimanded for publically criticizing the school board’s handling of past 
revenue proposals); see also Brown, 247 F.3d at 79 (applying the public employee doctrine to a 
tenured professor who claimed he was retaliated against for publically criticizing the university 
president); Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404 (applying the doctrine to public university professors who 
claimed a state law unconstitutionally infringed their First Amendment rights).  
In Brown, the court ultimately concluded the public employee doctrine precluded the 
professor’s claim because his speech did not regard a matter of public concern. 247 F.3d at 79. 
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Instead, he was voicing his displeasure with his employer’s decision to dismiss him. Id. The 
Urofsky court similarly held the doctrine prevented the professors’ First Amendment claims 
because the state law in question, which prevented public employees from using state-controlled 
computers to access sexually explicit material, did not affect the professors’ speech in their 
capacity as private citizens speaking on matters of public concern. 216 F.3d at 409.  
V. THIS COURT MUST REFRAIN FROM EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND UPHOLD 
THE COLLEGE’S FREEDOM TO FULFILL ITS EDUCATIONAL MISSION 
 
In Sweezy, this Court emphasized the fundamental role American institutions of higher 
learning play in the democratic process. 354 U.S. at 250. In so many words, the court suggested 
colleges and universities are the incubators of democratic freedom. Id. As such, colleges and 
universities are the conduits through which teachers, professors, and students exercise their 
academic freedom “to inquire, to study and to evaluate.” Id.  
In the context of First Amendment claims, this Court stressed the perilous implications of 
“impos[ing] any strait jacket” on the leaders of colleges and universities. Id. In Keyishian, this 
Court reiterated that sentiment. See 385 U.S. at 603 (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250) 
(commenting on the importance of academic freedom). In light of this, many courts have often 
refrained from interfering with public college and university officials’ decisions not adversely 
affecting the constitutional rights of others. See Lovelace, 793 F.2d at 426, n.2 (expounding the 
need for judicial restraint and deference to university officials in judging whether a professor’s 
grading policy complied with the university’s criteria); see also Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891 
(stating university officials, not federal judges, are better suited to decide their grading 
assignment procedures); Brown, 247 F.3d at 75 (holding grade assignments are not an issue 
warranting intrusive judicial oversight for First Amendment purposes); cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 
146 (stating the judiciary should avoid “intrusive oversight” over public officials’ personnel 
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decisions if the manner of termination is lawful yet may seem unreasonable or mistaken). In the 
present case, the College exercised its academic freedom in dismissing Respondent for her 
refusal to comply with a directive to reassess a student’s performance—a personnel decision they 
are free to make.  
Of course, minimal judicial oversight does not mean colleges and universities can 
exercise their academic freedom without consequence. External factors, such as market forces 
and regulatory and licensing organizations like the NCAA, generally discourage college and 
university administrators from making decisions that, though they are legal in a constitutional 
sense, may be considered unreasonable or worthy of sanction.  
CONCLUSION 
 The College did not violate Respondent’s free speech rights by dismissing her refusing to 
comply with a grading directive. First of all, Respondent’s act of issuing a grade does not 
constitute protected speech because such conduct is not inherently and politically expressive in 
nature. Secondly, though this is a case of first impression in this Court, lower courts have largely 
ruled against professors who claim free speech protection when dismissed for refusing to follow 
a university grading directive when the professor’s refusal lacks any meaningful protest or 
advocacy. Third, because the College’s academic freedom to decide how a course is taught 
means grades, and grading policies and procedures belong to the College, as well as the fact that 
Respondent’s academic freedom does not include superseding the university’s grading 
procedures, the doctrine of academic freedom does not apply under the circumstances. Fourth, 
based on the public employee doctrine, Respondent cannot bring a free speech claim against the 
College. In issuing a letter grade, she was not speaking in her role as a private citizen 
commenting on issues of public concern; rather, she was speaking pursuant to her official duties 
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as a public college professor. Finally, due to the important role colleges and universities play in 
shaping the minds of this Nation’s future, this Court should refrain from impeding on freedom of 
the academy to pursue its lawful ends. Lower courts have also stressed the need for minimal 
judicial oversight in the arena of academics. Finally, there are other, less judicially intrusive 
means, such as free market forces and quasi-governmental regulatory agencies, that may serve as 
a check on unpopular, though lawful, university decisions.  
PRAYER 
 For these reasons, Petitioner College of Southern Pemberley prays that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixteenth Circuit and render judgment in favor 
of Petitioner College of Southern Pemberley. 
Respectfully Submitted,    
/s/ Jesús N. Joslin     
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